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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the legal frameworks surrounding the EU’s energy policy and its 
associated institutional architecture. Particular focus is on the Agency for Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (ACER). Taking stock of ongoing debates concerning the Energy Union and 
recently proposed reforms, the purpose of this analysis is twofold. First, from a theoretical 
perspective, this article explores the limits of the principal/agent model for European 
integration after the Treaty of Lisbon. It argues that a rule of law analysis should supplement 
this model in order to improve the encapsulation of the complexities of delegation in policy 
areas such as energy. Second, this will enable a reflection on the principle of energy justice 
and the way in which it is articulated by policy and governance changes in the EU. 
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1 Introduction 
This article answers the calls to analyse EU energy law as a distinctive legal field (Heffron et 
al., 2018), and to promote energy justice as the most appropriate driver for regulation 
(Heffron and Talus, 2016a, 2016b; Heffron and McCauley, 2017). 1  Regulating EU energy 
presents important challenges, with Member States retaining wide powers in this area of 
shared competence. Article 194 TFEU introduced an express legal basis for policy cooperation, 
creating the premise for formalized delegation. The current system is hybrid, with regulatory 
and enforcement powers being delegated to (public) national regulatory authorities and to 
(private) transmission system operators, organized in networks and coordinated by ACER. 
These arrangements provoke fundamental questions: who are the principal decision-makers 
and to which agents do they delegate powers; how do principals and agents interact, given 
the relative autonomy of the latter; and what exactly is being delegated in energy regulation, 
a locus classicus of intertwining supranational policies? Following an analysis of the balance of 
powers in EU energy governance, the article contributes to policy development by showing 
that rule of law values are at stake. Indeed, energy regulation still needs to improve 
accountability, transparency, and legitimacy, even though the recent Clean Energy Package 
reform (or the ‘Winter Package’ EC, 2016a) addressed some of these challenges. 
The analytical framework of the article draws on a model suggested by Maher (2009), 
complementing the principal-agent theory from political science with a rule of law analysis in 
order to fully encapsulate the complexities of delegation in EU competition policy. Applying 
this model to the EU energy sector, the article determines whether the rule of law is included 
in the mechanisms structuring the cooperation, coordination, delegation and re-delegation 
relationships that exist between ACER, a ‘network agency’, and the Commission, NRAs, private 
actors, and networks of authorities and/or private actors. In this respect, the article 
                                                          
1 Abbreviations: ACER - Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators; C- Council of the EU; CEP – Clean Energy 
Package; CBCA - cross-border allocation of costs; DSO – distribution system operators; EC – European 
Commission; ECJ – European Court of Justice; ENTSOe - European Network of Transmission System Operators for 
Electricity; ENTSOg  European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas;  EP -European Parliament; GC- 
General Court; MS – (EU) Member States;  NRAs – National Regulatory Authorities;  P/A – principal/agent; PCI - 
projects of common interest; REMIT - Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency; ROCs 
– Regional Operational Centres; TEN-E - Trans-European Networks – Energy; TEU – Treaty on the European Union; 
TFEU – Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; TSOs – Transmission System Operators. 
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contributes to the literature on energy justice with a systematic legal analysis of agency 
accountability (as called for, more generally, by Mastenbroek and Martinsen, 2017). Energy 
justice, understood as the ‘just and equitable decision-making and results for all members of 
society at each stage of the energy cycle’ (Heffron and Talus, 2016a: 8), should be the main 
trigger of energy law in the 21st century (Heffron et al., 2018). Ensuring transparency and 
accountability of the various power relationships in energy governance is one of the eight 
principles of energy justice (Sovacool et al., 2016). These are also core concepts in 
administrative law and a specific articulation of the rule of law principle that no one is above 
the law. The article argues that increasing and clarifying ACER’s powers as well as enhancing 
its institutional capacity, would improve accountability and promote the rule of law, ultimately 
contributing to the goal of energy justice. 
The second section looks at the rule of law and its relevance to a principal-agent analysis. The 
third section outlines how powers are delegated within energy policy, focusing on the role of 
ACER. The fourth section analyses ACER and delegation of powers from a rule of law 
perspective, before concluding.  
2 Analytical framework: the P/A model and the Rule of Law  
2.1 The need for a refined P/A model of analysis 
P/A models were initially borrowed by political science from economics and have been 
employed to study the EU for over twenty years (Pollack, 1997). The framework is simple: 
principals (Member States) delegate powers (competences) to agents (the EU and its 
institutions) to undertake certain tasks. The questions that have been traditionally addressed 
are why, how, and with what consequences do national governments delegate political 
authority to supranational institutions? (Tallberg, 2002). However, in the increasingly complex 
decisional context of the EU following the Lisbon Treaty, the model needs to be applied 
liberally, yet handled with care (Maher et al:2009). In other words, the P/A theory needs to 
be refined, the questions asked redesigned, while the empirical application thereof should be 
expanded (Delreux and Adriaensen, 2017).  
This article answers this call, by focusing on a key aspect of the P/A model: the concern for 
control of the agent and the exercise of their discretion by the principal (e.g. McCubbins et al, 
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1987; 1989). This has an important functional dimension: how can the principal exercise 
control when the agent has more expertise and better access to information? In energy, the 
question is further complicated by the need to balance the ‘energy trilemma’ stemming from 
three conflicting regulatory aims: economics (finance), politics (energy security) and 
environment (climate mitigation). With EU decision making on energy requiring a just and 
equitable way to manage these competing aims (Heffron and McCauley, 2017; Schneider, 
2018), the normative dimension of the control that the principal exercises over the agent 
becomes crucial. Relying on previous work (Maher, 2009), we argue that this normative 
dimension needs to be routed in considerations of the rule of law. While recent literature has 
focussed on the analysis of rule of law values in specific areas, such as the network codes 
(Lavrijssen and Kohlbacher, 2018), our article addresses more generally the delegation of 
power in EU energy law. 
2.2 The rule of law concept and its articulation with energy justice 
The concept of energy justice resonates with a broad conception of the rule of law (Rose, 
2004), by relying on values such as human rights, justice and fairness (Sovacool et al., 2016). 
While noting the importance of these values, this paper is concerned with a narrower 
conception of the rule of law (Marmor, 2004), substantiated in the fourth principle of energy 
justice: all people should have access to fair, transparent and accountable forms of energy 
decision-making (Heffron and Talus 2016a). This relates essentially to the legitimation of 
executive power, and the key tenet that everyone is subject to the law, and no one is above 
the law. Consequently, the fourth principle of energy justice can be unpacked alongside two 
elements. One is the democratic delegation of powers by the people, to government, and its 
appropriate exercise. The second is accountability for the exercise of those powers, usually 
through elections, judicial review and accountability of government to parliament.  
In relation to the first element, for power to be exercised within the parameters of the rule of 
law, the rules through which laws are articulated must comply with certain key attributes. 
Dicey, a highly influential jurist in the common law tradition, noted how law must operate by 
way of general rules (all statutes apply to everyone because everyone is subject to the law); 
those rules must be clear (at least they can be interpreted by a court of law in a coherent 
fashion); promulgated prospectively and both possible to comply with and consistently 
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applied (the law cannot be applied retrospectively as the individual has to be able to organize 
their business knowing what is legal). Legal compliance must not be impossible (Dicey, 1914). 
Hence, there is a strong ex ante requirement as to how laws are framed: certainty; 
predictability; clarity and prospectivity are all required.  
The second element, accountability, goes beyond rule formulation to rule implementation, 
and is primarily ex post. Liberal democracies are characterised by an independent judiciary, 
and the right of the individual to have access to the courts is seen as critical by lawyers (access 
in principle at least – regard is not had here to the prohibitive cost of litigation and the limited 
legal aid available for administrative law actions with which we are concerned). The 
constitutionality of a measure, or its exercise, can be challenged, when it is ultra vires i.e. 
outside the law and beyond the parameters of authority conferred by legislation. The 
exponential growth in judicial review in the common law world in the last 30 years can, to 
some extent, be linked to the growth of the regulatory state and the welfare state, with a 
concomitant emergence of a functional approach to law (Rubin, 1990-91; Unger, 1976). The 
nature of accountability has also changed. Traditional public accountability structures, such as 
parliamentary accountability (e.g. through an annual reporting obligation) and judicial 
accountability (dispute resolution), have proved less effective considering the fragmentation 
of the state, the growth in discretion, and the growth in agencies operating at arm’s-length 
from executive principals (Scott, 2000, Graham, 2000). The legitimate exercise of power by 
agents is of concern from a rule of law perspective, given there is no direct democratic 
mandate, a weakening of the authority to exercise power and an increasing need for 
accountability.  
Accountability is closely connected to a major functional concern in the P/A literature: control. 
This necessarily raises the question as to the difference between these two concepts (Mulgan, 
2003; Bovens, 2007; Maher, 2009). Control can be seen as a functional consideration 
predicated on effectiveness, while accountability provides a normative dimension. Another 
way of explaining their difference, is one of ex ante managerial control over decision-making, 
and ex post oversight as accountability (Scott, 2000). However, given it is not clear where the 
distinction lies, it might be better to simply view them as a continuum (Scott, 2000; 
Maher:2007). While differences exist in the literature, all are agreed that for accountability, 
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the elements of explanation, reporting and engagement are a constant (Maher, 2007). It is 
alongside these general parameters that compliance with the fourth principle of energy justice 
in the European Union can be assessed. 
3 Delegation of powers in EU energy regulation  
3.1 Competence as prerequisite 
Competence in energy is shared between the EU and the MS (Art 4(2)(j)TEU). The EU can 
legislate in this area but so too can the MS, and the shape of the policy depends, in part, on 
how powers are shared between them. The policy aims to ensure the functioning of the 
energy market, security of supply, to promote efficiency and saving, develop new and 
renewable forms of energy, and finally to promote interconnection between energy networks 
(Art 194 TFEU). MS retain the right to determine the conditions for exploitation of energy 
resources, the choice between those resources, and the general structure of energy supply. 
In addition, the Union shall contribute to the development of trans-European networks in the 
area of energy infrastructure (Art 170 TFEU). Regard needs to be had to other legal principles, 
notably subsidiarity and proportionality (Art 5(3)&(4) TEU). Under the former, the EU shall 
only act insofar as the objectives cannot be achieved by the MS and under the latter, the Union 
shall only do that which is necessary to achieve the objective. This sharing of competence can 
be seen in the articulation of policy in secondary legislation, with the Third Energy Package2 
providing the MS with significant discretion (Talus, 2013).  
A necessary condition for the delegation of power is that the principal has competence to do 
so. Sharing competences means that it is more difficult to determine who is the principal, 
making multiple principals more likely. Formal legal competence is one way of distinguishing 
delegation from influence, and only those with formal authority within the respective field can 
be seen as principals. However, the challenge with this test is that the list of EU competences 
is modest. In energy, competences are functionally driven and vague, especially in relation to 
how they are shared (Thompson, 2015). Clarity is, however, difficult to achieve through 
secondary legislation, such as the proposed CEP. While the draft Recast Energy Directive, for 
                                                          
2 Electricity Directive (EP&C, 2009f); Gas Directive (EP&C, 2009e); Agency Regulation (EP&C, 2009b); Electricity 
Regulation (EP&C 2009c), Gas Regulation (EP&C 2009d), REMIT Regulation (EP&C, 2011), TEN-E Regulation (EP&C 
2013) 
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example, introduces some important measures in order to help achieve the EU renewable 
energy sources targets, the vague text of Article 194(2) TFEU could allow MS to determine 
their own energy mix, regardless of what is set at EU level. Authors go as far as to argue that 
the new governance model introduced by CEP hardens the open method of coordination 
employed in the energy sector in ways that might clash with the competence boundaries of 
A194(2)TFEU (Ringel and Knodt, 2018). Matters are complicated further by the fact that 
energy is a focus of intertwining national policies, including state aid, security, international 
relations, and the environment.  
Energy policy is therefore a field where there is incomplete delegation by the MS to the EU, 
as explicitly acknowledged by the Treaty. This creates a fertile ground for horizontal delegation 
to sectoral governance actors (Eberlein, 2008). The EC re-delegates policymaking 
responsibilities to national agencies and private stakeholders to achieve energy markets 
liberalisation and an internal market in energy, creating a system of double regulation, one 
being supranational (the Commission itself), and a hybrid national-supranational regulator, 
ACER (Chiti, 2009). The challenge is how to develop a coherent policy, where the ‘double’ 
delegation of function (Coen and Thatcher, 2008) becomes complex, with independent 
regulators at national level, combined with an EU network providing coordination, monitoring 
and support. 
3.2 To whom is the power delegated? 
The strategy of the EC has been to close the ‘regulatory gap’ generated by the failure to 
harmonize sensitive sectors (such as energy), through promoting informal harmonization by 
transnational regulatory networks (Eberlein and Grande, 2005). The creation of NRAs in 
energy was pushed through three liberalization packages, with the final outcome a network 
of national regulatory authorities. This is indicative of the compromises inherent in 
competences sharing. These authorities were entrusted with various tasks, including 
interconnection and unbundling, network access, and tariffs. They cooperated voluntarily at 
first, through the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (EC, 2003), a platform 
tasked formally with advising the EC. This was insufficient (EC, 2006) to close the regulatory 
gap between the NRAs and the Commission and to establish a legal framework for cross-
border energy trade. The need for a European regulator was apparent. In 2011, ACER was 
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created, an agency with limited powers, but still an upgrade from the voluntary cooperation 
it replaced.  
ACER has the most complex organizational structure of all network administrative 
organisations (Iborra et al, 2018). It cooperates closely with the EC, the NRAs, and the TSOs. 
The TSOs themselves cooperate within the European networks of transmission system 
operators for gas (ENTSOg) and electricity (ENTSOe). CEP proposes setting up further 
cooperation entities, such as regional operational centres, to complement the TSOs and to 
prevent fragmented and uncoordinated national actions. (EC, 2016b, Art 32(3)) Furthermore, 
CEP envisages cooperation between the TSOs and the Distribution System Operators (DSOs), 
as well as the creation of a new DSO entity for electricity, comprising the unbundled/not 
vertically integrated DSOs. (EC, 2016b, Arts 49-51) 
Alongside ACER, and formally constituted outside the EU, the Council of European Energy 
Regulators (CEER) provides another platform for cooperation between electricity and/or gas 
NRAs from the EU, Iceland and Norway. It is meant to complement but not overlap with the 
work of ACER (Eberlein and Grande, 2005), with both bodies sharing some common members.  
Other forums provide for coordination or/and advice to the EC. They consist of various 
formations of officials from MS, representatives of ACER, ENTSOG, the industry and 
consumers. For instance, an early voluntary platform, the Florence Electricity Forum, together 
with the Madrid Forum (on the internal gas market and cross-border trade), play an important 
informal role in the creation of network codes (Groenleer, 2016). Another example is the Gas 
Coordination Group, which facilitates the coordination of measures concerning security of gas 
supply (EP&C, 2009a). 
The system is complex, (see figure 1), with certain actors acting at certain times as agents, and 
at other times as principals. This is perhaps inevitable given the indistinct boundaries of shared 
competences and the range of potential tensions between the aims of the policy. The system 
has developed in stages, currently culminating in ACER, which has the power to coordinate, 
monitor and make decisions in technical (rather than policy) matters. Facing the Commission 
and a wide range of stakeholders, including NRAs, it straddles the public and private spheres, 
raising questions as to whom it is accountable, and who is accountable to it, and for what. 
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Potentially upward (to the Commission), downward (to the stakeholders – though perhaps 
outward accountability might be a better term here), and horizontally (to NRAs and the CEER) 
(Scott, 2000).  
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Fig 1: Diagram of Various Agents/Principals in the Energy Sector and their links to ACER 
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3.3 What power is delegated? 
The complexity of the system is reflected in the range of legal instruments which underpin it. 
While the main Agency Regulation is the legal foundation of the ACER, its tasks are spread 
over all instruments of the third energy package. This makes it difficult to track where 
delegation has occurred, by whom and of what tasks. Furthermore, with energy, we notice a 
departure from the classic P/A dyadic model of competence sharing, where the EU and the 
MS were being given separate tasks and limited ways of interaction. Instead, regulation in the 
sector follows an ‘integrative paradigm’ whereby the Commission and regulatory networks 
are working together towards the application of European law (Hancher and Larouche, 2011). 
It is against this background that ACER exercises its tasks to encourage cooperation between 
European energy regulators.  
The institutional layout of ACER raises challenges for these tasks. In particular, the Agency 
relies on voluntary cooperation of NRAs and secondment of experts from those authorities to 
participate in its work. This assumes the NRAs will continue to support the agency through 
working groups, and coordination groups (ACER, 2015a). This is not exclusive to the energy 
field, but is common to regulation through networks, where trust and willingness to cooperate 
are crucial (Eberlein and Grande, 2005). 
Further challenges to ACER’s activity stem from the fact that the Agency was only delegated 
limited powers, according to a strict reading of the leading CJEU judgment, Meroni (ECJ, 1958) 
According to the ‘Meroni doctrine’, the EU institutions can only delegate implementing 
powers that are clearly defined and supervised by the delegator (or the judiciary) (ECJ, 1981) 
on the basis of specific and objective criteria. Discretionary powers involving political 
judgment that might upset the institutional balance cannot be delegated (Scott, 2005; 
Yataganas, 2001). Following Meroni, the European Parliament’s proposals to grant more 
powers to ACER were systematically rejected (Chamon, 2016), with ACER’s powers reduced 
further because MS vigorously asserted their shared competence (Ermacora, 2010).  
ACER supports and coordinates NRAs in performing their functions whilst carrying out 
complementary regulatory tasks alongside them. It can issue recommendations and opinions 
(non-binding soft laws that are influential). It cannot veto actions by TSOs or NRAs, given the 
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Meroni doctrine, and has decisional powers on only technical issues. 3  Under the REMIT 
regulation (which deals with monitoring market integrity and transparency), ACER is 
responsible for gathering and centralizing information. 4  In a policy area involving highly 
specialized technical knowledge, information becomes an important tool for regulation and 
control (Eberlein and Grande, 2005), with ACER acting as a node within a wider network of 
regulatory bodies (Burris et al., 2008). 
The role of ACER is crucial for projects creating an Energy Union. The agency uses several tools 
to promote market integration, such as regional initiatives, the network codes and market 
monitoring, as well as the Gas Market Model. However, its actions are limited in areas such as 
energy security and energy poverty, with authors arguing that these regulatory tools are too 
indirect to address politically and socially charged issues (Labelle, 2017). This raises important 
questions as to ACER’s ability to contribute to the field of energy law and promotion of energy 
justice. The fact that ACER operates mainly through soft law, hampers its capacity to ensure 
oversight on the development of the internal energy market, and to address relevant cross-
border issues. To a limited extent, the CEP proposals strengthen ACER’s role by focusing on its 
role as a coordinator. At the regional level, it would supervise the ROCs, with the NRAs of the 
geographical areas in which a ROC is established exercising regulatory functions (EC, 2016c, 
Art 8). New decision-making power would be granted to ACER in relation to capacity 
mechanisms, concerning the methodologies establishing generation adequacy and risk 
preparedness, and in relation to developing common methodologies, in order to enable cross-
border participation (EC, 2016c). 
4 Analysis: EU Energy Governance in the Context of the Rule of Law 
Our theoretical framework suggests that a key concern is to give effect to the notion that no 
one is above the law, and that those subject to the law only agree to be ruled because they 
have delegated their autonomy to the ruler. Therefore, the question of legitimacy of action 
significantly increases the further the exercise of power is from the direct electoral mandate. 
                                                          
3 For example network codes, certification of TSOs, provision of information, rules for trading of electricity and 
on investment incentives for construction of inter-connector capacity under the Third Package, as well as 
decisions on investment requests, including cross-border cost allocation under the TEN-E Regulation. 
4 To this end, ACER has set up an online portal on the REMIT information system (ARIS), which will enable market 
participants to report transactions as provided for in the Regulation and implementing acts. 
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Through accountability mechanisms legitimisation of delegated authority is realised. This has 
little to do with input, usually associated with democratic politics (Scharpf, 1999). Instead, 
output legitimacy can be sought through audit and inspection (McCubbins et al, 1987, 1989), 
leaving procedural/process legitimacy as the main concern (Maher, 2009), which Thatcher and 
Stone Sweet (2002) argue can be a substitute for electoral legitimacy. Assessing accountability 
mechanisms is therefore key to determining whether the rule of law is observed by the current 
EU energy regulatory framework (subsection 4.1). 
Even if not a sufficient substitute for input legitimacy (Schmidt:2012), the perception of fair 
process has an important functional as well as a normative role in improving rule compliance 
(Tyler and Huo, 2002, ch. 4; Wenzel, 2002). Schmidt (2012), adopting the term throughput 
legitimacy, has also sought to focus attention on the process of governance, particularly the 
‘efficacy, accountability and transparency of the EU's governance processes along with their 
inclusiveness and openness to consultation with the people’ (at 2), going beyond narrower 
procedural concerns, such as giving reasons or ensuring a right to be heard, shedding light on 
what Schmidt calls the ‘black box’ of governance. Throughput legitimacy resonates particularly 
well with the fourth principle of energy justice, ‘transparency and accountability’ (Heffron and 
Talus, 2016), making these criteria relevant for the analysis of EU energy regulation (see 
subsection 4.2).  
Other characteristics of law and general considerations of legitimacy and accountability, are 
also seen as crucial to the rule of law. Lon Fuller (1964) identifies eight characteristics of law: 
generality, promulgation, no retroactivity, clarity, no contradictory rules, no impossible 
prescriptions, stability and consistent application. These will not categorically identify an 
activity as being within the rule of law, because such checklists do not sufficiently address 
substantive matters (specifically in relation to Fuller (see Hart, 1958; Manderson, 2010; Cane, 
2010). Nonetheless, this exercise will shed light on roles, legitimacy, and the framing function 
of law in relation to policy elaboration, which are essential in evaluating EU energy law as an 
autonomous field. The focus on the rule of law also provides a useful conceptual bridge 
between the disciplines of law and politics, given that the concept is relevant to both. Selected 
Fullerian criteria will be employed to test several problematic aspects of EU energy 
governance. EU energy laws are general, were properly promulgated, do not apply 
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retroactively, and do not contain impossible prescriptions. Our assessment in subsections 4.3 
will focus on the issues of clarity, the potential existence of contradictory rules, stability, and 
the consistent application of the regulatory framework. 
4.1 Accountability 
Lavrijssen and Hancher (2009) suggest that network agencies raise important issues of 
accountability. The Agency Regulation attempts to address this by requiring ACER to consult 
and report to EU institutions and bodies (EP&C, 2009b, Arts 12, 13(5) & 15(5)). The Boards of 
ACER are construed to ensure representation of interests of the Union, MS (Administrative 
Board) and regulators (Board of Regulators). In turn, ACER monitors both the ENTSOs and the 
NRAs, and is accountable to the Commission for this role (EP&C, 2009c, Art 9; EP&C, 2009d, 
Art 9). However, holding MS to account for a NRAs’ failure to achieve their tasks is 
complicated. The Commission would need to show that the measures were reasonable, within 
the authorities’ powers, and did not encroach on the competence of another authority, such 
as the competition authorities (Johnston & Block, 2012). 
While the involvement of ACER, the Commission, the NRAs and the ENTSOs in energy 
regulation might seem redundant, recent research argues that this redundancy might lead to 
positive outcomes from an accountability perspective. For instance, the interaction between 
all these entities in the creation of network codes (Fig 2) raises the question of whether work 
is unnecessarily duplicated. However, practice shows that ACER does not simply adopt views 
expressed by ENTSOs in its draft network codes (example EC, 2017b), nor does the 
Commission simply rubberstamp ACER’s work (EC, 2017a). It is expected that this participation 
increases the potential for reliability, responsiveness and innovation in energy regulation 
(Groenleer, 2016). 
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Fig 2 The Creation of Network Codes. Source: ACER 
The Lisbon Treaty enlarged the jurisdiction of the CJEU to cover acts of agencies intended to 
produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. In the case of ACER, access to European Courts is 
placed at one remove, by the creation of an internal Board of Appeal. While there is some 
provision for a member to not sit where there is a conflict of interest, this is not a judicial body 
in terms of membership, although it carries out a judicial role. It provides an evaluation by 
peers, whose decisions can then be challenged before the CJEU. Given that ACER mainly acts 
through soft law, review of such instruments is sometimes impossible, be it by the Board of 
Appeal or by the CJEU (Stefan & Petri, in press). One episode of the German-Austrian bidding 
zone split saga5 is illustrative in this regard. In E-control, the Austrian regulator sought the 
annulment of an ACER opinion issued under Article 7 of the Agency Regulation. The opinion 
recommended, at the request of the Polish regulator, the implementation of a coordinated 
capacity allocation procedure on the German-Austrian border. E-control’s claim was rejected 
                                                          
5  Traditionally, the territory of Austria, Germany, and Luxembourg represented one sole bidding zone for 
electricity. Recently, calls have been made for that zone to split, given the significant power flows through the 
transmission grids in neighbouring countries. (See also ACER Decision No 06/2016 of 17 November 2016 on the 
Electricity Transmission System Operators’ Proposal for the Determination of Capacity Calculation Regions 
currently challenged by E-Control in the pending case Case T-332/17). 
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by both the Board of Appeal (ACER, 2015b) and by the Court (GC, 2016 & 2017) on grounds 
that Article 7 opinions lacked legally binding effects. 
The need for accountability emerges also from a soft law dialogue between ACER and the 
Commission. In 2010, the Commission published an interpretative note on the independence 
of the NRAs (EC, 2010), and ACER responded in 2016 with a recommendation (ACER, 2016). 
Several proposals appear particularly useful, such as the creation of a system of accountability 
of NRAs to national parliaments (rather than national governments). Accountability could be 
strengthened through increasing institutional independence and improved clarification of the 
respective roles played by the NRAs and the MS. Clearer rules of procedure or nomination, 
appointment and dismissal of key positions within the NRAs may also help avoid regulatory 
capture and promote the independence of the authorities. Finally, one should not overlook 
the importance of financial independence and adequate resourcing, with ACER advocating for 
funding through cost-reflective fees. 
4.2 Consultations and transparency 
Consultations with the stakeholders improve transparency and are needed for effective 
accountability. ACER is required ‘to consult extensively and at an early stage when carrying 
out its tasks with market participants, TSOs, consumers, end-users and, where relevant, 
competition authorities.’ (EP&C, 2009b, Art 10(1)). Consultations must be open and 
transparent, tasks concerning TSOs are to be transparent, and the Agency publishes on its 
website the agenda, background documents, and minutes of the meetings of its governance 
boards. The third energy package created a legal framework conducive to accountability, 
transparency, and impartiality of national regulators (Heffron, 2016, p 53). These 
requirements, reflecting the prominence given to transparency in Article 15 TFEU, underlie a 
broad conception of institutional openness, which includes not only access to objective and 
reliable information or documents (EP&C, 2009b, Art 10(2)), but also has a participatory 
function (Curtin et al, 2013). 
Are such consultations considered by the institution concerned? Article 10(3) of the Agency 
Regulation ensures oversight, at least in relation to consultations on framework guidelines 
and amendments to network codes (Fig 2). ACER is required to show how the consultation has 
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been taken into account and why observations have not been followed, consequently 
facilitating oversight. Consultations are not necessarily required for all delegated acts. While 
stakeholders must be consulted when amending network codes, the Commission is not bound 
by consultations to modify the guidelines of Article 18 of the Electricity Regulation and Article 
23 of the Gas Regulation; it simply has to follow the comitology procedure. The Commission 
is not bound to consult when modifying, rejecting, or drafting a new guideline which would 
form the basis of network codes. Finally, ACER suggested in its 2016 recommendation to 
formalising best practices on stakeholder consultations at the national level.  
Consultations play an important role in enforcement, with a functionality platform to support 
the implementation of gas network codes being recently set up by ACER in cooperation with 
ENSOg. This is a process which has been created with the support of the Commission, involving 
a web-based tool through which stakeholders can discuss different issues arising from the 
implementation of the gas network codes. The idea is that interested parties actively 
participate in policy/law making, by developing solutions to problems. However, the platform 
has not been that active, and a new initiative to enlarge the ambit of its addressees is being 
put in place (ACER, 2017). 
4.3 Analysis of problematic Fullerian criteria 
4.3.1 No Contradictory Rules 
Where objectives are inconsistent, the risk increases of inconsistency and uncertainty in the 
law. The consequences are twofold. First, this can make legal compliance and enforcement 
more difficult. Second, in the supranational context, this creates uncertainty regarding the 
decision maker and its competence. Energy policy objectives are notoriously conflicting. For 
instance, the objective of ensuring a free market clashes with the objective of security of 
energy supply (Talus, 2013; Helm, 2012), which is illustrated by crises, such as that in 2006 
when Russia stopped supply through Ukraine. The opening of markets for renewables 
stipulated by CEP might conflict with climate mitigation targets, as provided under current 
policy frameworks (Kettner-Marks and Kletzan-Slamanig, 2018). More generally, investment 
is needed in order to achieve Article 194 TFEU goals, and this cannot be left completely to the 
markets. Such investment will require legal certainty, predictability of market conditions, as 
well as the reassurance that the State/EU will offer some support.  
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Energy is situated at the intersection of various areas of EU action. This generates overlaps 
between the activity of different institutions and agencies, creating tensions and 
contradictions. Cooperation between national regulators and national competition 
authorities is crucial (Heffron, 2016). This is not specific to energy, with MS engaging recently 
in reforms to enhance coherence in the enforcement of the law by competition authorities 
and sector regulators (Graham, 2016). Competition has been used by the Commission to 
regulate the energy field on a case by case basis, through the monitoring of State aid or 
mergers (Eberlein and Grande, 2005; Eberlein, 2008; Helm, 2012), while the enforcement 
focus has shifted in the last decade at the national level (Scholz and Purps, 2012). Even if the 
enforcement of competition rules should be used with caution, and not as a substitute for 
regulation (Eberlein, 2008), these rules need to be seriously considered by ACER in its activity. 
More specifically, these rules are relevant when ACER carries out its monitoring duties 6 
regarding competition law aspects of energy regulation, and, on that basis, it may submit to 
the European Parliament and the Commission an opinion as to how to address the problems 
identified. Furthermore, the information sharing entrusted to ACER under the REMIT 
regulation might raise competition concerns, particularly the risk of collusion (Feltkamp and 
Musialski 2013). In this context, good cooperation with the national competition authorities 
is vital for the maintenance of the rule of law, given that it is the latter who have both the 
expertise and the jurisdiction in competition law (Hrabcakova & Liptak, 2014). The new CEP 
proposals might create new overlaps because ACER is empowered to draw up standards to 
assess system adequacy (EC, 2016c), which in turn can be used to determine compliance of 
capacity mechanisms with State aid rules. This can be problematic since, under the Treaty 
framework, it is the Commission who has exclusive competence to assess compatibility of 
State aid with the internal market. 
Overlaps with financial services regulation might also occur, with REMIT imposing an 
obligation to inform the European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) wherever there is 
suspicion that market abuse might affect financial instruments. Other overlaps might exist in 
relation to the activity of bodies competent in environmental matters. Over fifty planning, 
                                                          
6  ACER monitors: whether network codes/draft documents of ENTSOs promote effective competition; the 
internal markets in electricity and natural gas, in particular their retail prices , access to the network and 
compliance with consumer rights (A11 Agency Regulation). 
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reporting, and monitoring obligations of the climate acquis are streamlined within the recently 
agreed Regulation on the governance of the energy union, while entrusting the European 
Environment Agency (and not ACER) with the task of assisting the Commission in its work 
regarding decarbonisation and energy efficiency. (EP&C, 2018, Art 42) 
4.3.2 Clarity 
The above discussion concerning the various intersections between fields of regulation is also 
relevant to assessing clarity. ACER’s tasks are spread throughout multiple legislative 
instruments dealing with the various aspects of energy regulation. CEP consolidates some of 
these tasks in the proposed Agency Regulation, therefore contributing to enhanced clarity. 
Two institutional design issues reduce the clarity of the law and how it is implemented. First, 
the initial failure to put in place a pan-EU agency. Second, the shared competence of the EU 
and the MS. Regarding the first, two parallel and closely overlapping regulatory networks are 
active in energy: ACER and the CEER. They share similar memberships (except that CEER 
membership extends to EFTA countries) and the same main objectives (EP&C, 2009b, Recital 
5; CEER, 2015, Arts 3&5). Although they differ in the sense that ACER exercises powers 
stemming from EU legislation, while CEER has no competence to issue decisions and no 
obligation to offer advice, in practice, ACER and CEER do overlap (Maggetti, 2013).  
The second design issue regards the relationship between ACER and the NRAs. While NRAs 
are supposed to cooperate (EP&C, 2009c, Art 6; EP&C, 2009d, Art 7), clashes of competence 
might arise given the cross-border character of energy transmission. ACER is supposed to 
respect the independence and powers of the NRAs, under subsidiarity (EP&C, 2009b, Recital 
29). Its main objective is to foster NRA cooperation and participation. However, the actual 
extent of the competence depends on the way subsidiarity is interpreted (Haverbeke et al, 
2010), while further complications stem from the interplay between the areas of exclusive 
competences of ACER and of the NRAs. One example of the latter regards the implementation 
of network codes and guidelines. These are adopted by the Commission following comitology, 
and ACER has monitoring powers over their consistent implementation. However, ACER lacks 
enforcement powers, so it counts on the cooperation of national authorities for 
implementation. The potential for a clash of competence is addressed by the fact that senior 
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representatives from the NRAs sit on the ACER Board of Regulators (Haverbeke et al., 2010). 
The proposed CEP provides for some enforcement powers for ACER: the competence to 
decide on terms, methodologies and algorithms for the implementation of electricity network 
codes and guidelines (EC, 2016c, Art 5). This would contribute to enhancing clarity, (as well as 
consistency), at least to a certain extent. 
Finally, clarity and consistent application may be undermined both by the nature of the legal 
instruments used by ACER in carrying out its functions, and by the absence of any specific steer 
in relation to the content of such measures in primary legislation. For instance, ACER develops 
framework guidelines that will be the basis for ENTSOs’ network codes, but there is no precise 
indication in the third package as to what the framework guidelines or network codes should 
contain. Also, ACER has the competence to issue opinions with regards to the activity of the 
NRAs (EP&C, 2009b, Art 7(4)). Such opinions may be followed, or disregarded by the NRAs, 
and, as confirmed by recent case law, have no legally binding force (GC, 2016; GC, 2017). 
Should some of these opinions be breached, upon notification from ACER, nothing prevents 
the Commission, in principle, from starting infringement proceedings. Such uncertain legal 
nature and effects of soft law instruments raise clarity concerns, especially considering that 
the soft law developed within the network of regulatory authorities is becoming more and 
more relevant and is being adopted at the national level as a result of the high policy 
interdependence between the members of the network (Maggetti, 2013; Maggetti and 
Gilardi, 2014). It seems that, paradoxically, ACER’s lack of decision-making powers is 
supplemented in practice by a broad discretion to issue non- binding instruments, which can 
ultimately undermine the Meroni doctrine. 
4.3.3 Stability 
ACER contributes to the stability of the regulatory system through its advisory functions for 
European institutions (EP&C, 2009b, Art 5). For this role to be meaningful, it is important to 
ensure the independence of the Agency, and of the national regulators. Departing from the 
Common Approach on Decentralised Agencies (EP,C&EC, 2012), ACER has an Administrative 
Board and a Board of Regulators, conferring independence from private stakeholders, political 
institutions, and the Commission (Chiti, 2009, p 1429). The CEP proposals opted for preserving 
the two boards, as concentrating administrative and regulatory functions would be 
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‘premature’ at the current stage of market integration. Nonetheless, it is important to note 
that, as for any EU agency, independence from EU institutions is limited by financial 
arrangements as well as by the boundaries of EU policies (Chamon, 2016).  
Decisions are taken within the Board of Regulators, made up of representatives from the 
NRAs. While independent, the members, with one vote each, can act on behalf of their 
national authority (EP&C, 2009b, Art 14(5)). Ermacora has argued in favour of similar vote 
weightings as those used in the Council (2010) but this would suggest a political dimension to 
the work of the Board that may not be consistent with its exercise of delegated authority and 
its independence from either MS or the Commission. CEP aligns voting rules with the rules laid 
out in the Common Approach on Decentralized Agencies (simple majority for current business 
instead of 2/3) (EC, 2016c, Recital 34). The Administrative Board adopts the work programme 
and has budgetary powers. It represents EU and national interests, including nominees from 
the Commission, Parliament, and Council. While Members of the Parliament are expressly 
excluded from sitting on the Board (EP&C, 2009b, Art 12), Commission officials, by the nature 
of their job, cannot be independent from the Commission. However, this composition ensures 
that ACER benefits from the administrative expertise of the Commission services, therefore 
potentially enhancing consistency and the socialization of members of the Board leading, to a 
form of what Mashaw (2006) calls social accountability, which is akin to peer review. The ACER 
Director, appointed by the ACER Administrative Board (representing EU interests) from a 
choice of three candidates suggested by the Commission and following a positive opinion from 
the Board of Regulators (consisting of NRAs), has the power to take the recommendations, 
opinions, and decisions, subject to the guidance and opinion of the Board of Regulators.  
Regarding the NRAs, the third energy package ensured greater independence from market 
and political interests, therefore increasing the potential for system stability. It imposed a 
single authority per MS, being distinct and independent from any other public or private entity 
and having a separate annual budget allocation (EP&C, 2009e, Art 39; EP&C 2009f, Art 35). 
This might have created some problems in continental countries from a separation of power 
perspective, with executive agencies’ powers limited to the mechanical application of the law 
(Hancher and Larouche, 2011; ECJ, 2009) However, research shows how, through Commission 
pressure, institutional isomorphism and participation in ACER, exceptionally independent 
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regulatory agencies can develop in countries not necessarily sharing the independent agency 
model – such as Germany (Ruffing, 2014). A challenge ahead for ACER is to coordinate the 
cooperation of the DSOs within the proposed new entity for electricity. This is because their 
diversity is high (with around 2400 DSOs active in the MS) and their independence 
questionable (with further DSO unbundling dropped out from the final proposals) (Hancher 
and Winters, 2017). 
4.3.4 Consistent application 
Network industry regulation is generally criticized on the grounds of consistency in 
implementation and application, with MS approaching issues from divergent points of view 
(Hancher and Larouche, 2011). On the positive side, ACER’s structure, with a Board of 
Regulators comprised of senior officials from the NRAs, is conducive to cooperation between 
authorities, an important requirement for ensuring the consistency of the regulatory energy 
framework across Europe. Furthermore, ACER plays an important advisory role, and can make 
recommendations to assist the authorities in sharing good practices, and such 
recommendations may in turn become legally binding through Commission endorsement. 
(EP&C, 2009b, Art 7(3)). There is of course room for improvement on this front, with ACER’s 
2016 recommendation suggesting the need to strengthen cooperation at the EU level by 
including in the legislation an obligation for the NRAs to cooperate at the level of ACER, with 
participation in the meetings of the Board of Regulators considered as a minimum. 
On the negative side, ACER’s powers are limited to issuing non-binding acts or soft law, giving 
it capacity to highlight and influence but not sanction. The latter remains the role of either the 
EC or national authorities. For example, ACER can only have a limited contribution to the 
development, throughout Europe, of consistent technical specifications on connectivity to 
generation and distribution installations. It cannot require such consistency, given that it can 
only make non-binding recommendations on technical rules adopted by the MS. (EP&C 2009f, 
Art 5;  EP&C, 2009e, Art 8) Also, ACER can only recommend amendments to national ten year 
network development plans laid out by the ENTSOs (EP&C, 2009c, Art 8(11); EP&C, 2009d, Art 
8(11)), where they are inconsistent with the Union-wide network development plan. 
Furthermore, ACER’s oversight in relation to the compliance of decisions taken by NRAs with 
the guidelines referred to in the third energy package is limited. ACER neither has the initiative 
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of this compliance control (which can be undertaken solely upon request by an NRA or the 
Commission), nor does it have any real decision making power in this regard, as it can only 
issue a non-binding opinion. In case the NRA disregards such opinions, ACER cannot impose 
any sanctions; it can only inform the MS concerned and the Commission, which can secure a 
judgment under an Article 258 TFEU infringement procedure where the MS fails to meet its 
obligation (EP&C, 2009b, Art 7; EP&C 2009f, Art 39; EP&C, 2009e, Art 43). A final example 
concerns ACER’s powers with regard to ensuring wholesale energy market integrity and 
transparency. If it suspects that REMIT has been breached, ACER may ask an NRA to supply 
information, commence investigations, take appropriate action to remedy the breach, and 
create and coordinate investigatory groups in case there is suspicion of cross-border impact. 
The responsibility for binding legal action however lies with the NRAs and not ACER.  
ACER’s powers are limited to achieve a consistent application of the law in the area of trans-
European energy infrastructures. Expensive projects of common interest (PCI) are financed, 
according to the TEN-E Regulation (EP&C, 2013, p 39-75), by the MS concerned, and the NRAs 
have the competence to decide on the cross-border allocation of costs (CBCA). ACER can 
decide on CBCAs only if the NRAs fail to reach an agreement. In an attempt to ensure 
consistency, ACER issued a non-binding recommendation (ACER, 2013) laying out unified 
guidelines on how NRAs should split bills for PCIs. Yet, in a case concerning the Gas 
Interconnection between Poland and Lithuania, the NRAs proposed a CBCA that departed 
from ACER’s unified guidelines (ACER, 2013),7 showing the limited reach of such soft law 
instruments. In the end, the NRAs failed to reach an agreement on the Polish-Lithuanian 
project, and ACER used its residual decision-making power (EP&C, 2013, Art 12(6)) and set the 
CBCA in line with its own guidelines. Nonetheless, one can easily imagine a situation where 
NRAs agree on allocations that depart from the unified guidelines. Fresa (2015) suggests that 
the law should be changed to give ACER more power to make CBCA decisions for PCIs. Such 
centralization would ensure consistency, promote the European interest, while maintaining a 
high standard of expertise at the level of the regulator. 
                                                          
7  The NRAs proposal it established different ways of compensating the project promoters and differing 
allocations of compensation between the contributing MS. 
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CEP proposes the strengthening of ACER’s coordination role, and this will help ensure 
consistency, with most of the new measures aimed at preventing fragmentation ensuing from 
national decision-making on cross-border issues. For example, new decisional powers are 
attributed to ACER in relation to capacity mechanisms. Such tools, aimed at ensuring security 
of supply, are essentially State aid interventions. Article 107 TFEU stipulates that interventions 
must be approved by the EC. CEP gives a role to ACER to create common standards to assess 
compatibility with the internal market of capacity mechanisms introduced by the MS (EC, 
2016b, Art 19). Such common standards will help improve both consistency and clarity in the 
application of the law. However, this proposal would mean, in practice, delegating the power 
to set criteria for State aid assessment from the Commission to an Agency, which raises 
competence concerns. Another proposal to enhance consistency is the strengthening of 
ACER’s coordination role at the regional level, by granting ACER power to supervise the ROCs 
and competence to decide on methodologies enabling providers to participate in market-wide 
capacity mechanisms (EC, 2016b, Arts 21-22).Both these measures are aimed at carving out 
regional specificities and adapting to the application of general rules, consequently creating 
scope for diversity. 
5 Conclusions and policy implications 
This article assessed centralization and (re)-delegation of powers in EU energy regulation, 
drawing on the framework of the P/A theory from political science, while supplementing the 
analysis with a rule of law perspective. It endorsed various proposals to improve the current 
system of accountability, and it is important to highlight the following. First, in EU energy 
regulation, meaningful cooperation between authorities active at various levels of governance 
and in different sectors of activity (such as competition) is crucial for preserving the delicate 
balance of shared competences. Second, ACER’s powers need to be strengthened, by either 
restructuring its functions in order to avoid competence overlap or by allowing ACER to issue 
more legally binding decisions and reduce its dependency on national regulators or the EC. At 
first sight, such a suggestion might seem to conflict with the Meroni doctrine. However, it 
needs to be noted that the Meroni doctrine carries different meanings according to the 
academic literature or institutional practice and has been significantly reduced following the 
Short-Selling case (ECJ, 2014) to the simple prohibition of delegating discretionary powers, 
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understood in controversially loose terms (Chamon, 2016). Furthermore, if one is to take 
Meroni and Short Selling seriously, one should note that an important component of the 
doctrine concerns accountability, institutional balance, and, more specifically, judicial review. 
Or, as illustrated by the case law, the plethora of non-binding instruments issued by ACER is 
not amenable to review by Courts or even by ACER’s own Board of Appeals. Third, the financial 
implications of increasing ACER’s powers should not be overlooked, and appropriate funding 
should be granted to the Agency, as suggested by its Director in various activity reports.  
This article provides a necessary normative context within which to view delegation of 
executive powers and further substantiates the principle of energy justice, as a foundational 
principle for energy law as an autonomous legal field. A narrow conception of the rule of law 
resonates with procedural energy justice, or ‘the equal ability of all social groups to be able to 
participate in decision-making processes in proposed energy developments’ (Heffron et al, 
2018: 42). In this respect, it transpired that for a field of shared competence like energy, 
transparency as a prerequisite for the exercise of effective accountability, is important. 
Furthermore, issues arise as to the scope of consistency and clarity in energy law, which reflect 
underlying tensions as to the scope of delegation and the inconsistency of competing 
objectives in the policy field. Given these tensions, the rule of law is a current work-in-progress 
in EU energy law. With soft law mechanisms, this may be the most that can be hoped for and 
realised. This suggests that accountability should remain a primary focus in order to foster 
energy justice in Europe.  
Acknowledgements 
The authors are grateful for comments from the anonymous reviewers of Energy Policy as well 
as from the participants at the following events: Use and Limitations of the Principal-Agent 
Model in Studying EU Politics, (April 23 and 24 2014, Université Catholique de Louvain); the 
UK Energy Law and Policy Association 2015 Annual Event, (September 10-11 2015, University 
College, Oxford); the Research Seminar at City University, London, of 15 February 2018. Thanks 
to Maria Kendrick, Monika Tobjasz, Ronan Riordan, and Francis McNamara for research 
assistance. 
26 
 
i 
i References 
ACER, 2013. Recommendation 7/2013 regarding the cross-border cost request submitted in 
the framework of the first union list of electricity and gas projects of common interest 
https://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Recommendations/A
CER%20Recommendation%2007-2013.pdf  
ACER, 2015a. Work Programme 2015, 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Publication/ACER%20
Work%20Programme%202015.pdf  
ACER, 2015b.  Decision of the Board of Appeal of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulations [26 December 2015]. A-001-2015. Available at 
https://www.acer.europa.eu/en/The_agency/Organisation/Board_of_Appeal/Decisions/238
%20A-001-2015%20BoA%20decision%20(non%20confidential%20version)%202112-
2112.pdf, last accessed 14th of November 2018.   
ACER, 2016. Recommendation No 1/2016 On Ensuring the Independence of the Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators and of National Regulatory Authorities, 30 May 2016 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Recommendations/A
CER%20Recommendation%2001-2016.pdf  
ACER, 2017. ACER and ENTSOG upgrade the functionality platform to support the 
implementation of gas network codes. Press Release 1/08/2017.  Ljubljana. 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/Media/Press%20releases/ACER%20PR-05-17.pdf  
Bovens, M., 2007. ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework’ 13(4) 
European Law Journal 447. 
Burris S., Kempa M. and Shearing C., 2008. ‘Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary 
Review of Current Scholarship’ 41 Akron Law Review 1. 
Cane, P., 2010. The Hart Fuller Debate in the Twenty-First Century. Hart, Oxford. 
CEER, 2015. Articles of Association of the Council of European Electricity Regulators ASBL – 
Consolidated on 15 September 2015.   Available at 
https://www.ceer.eu/documents/104400/-/-/c688187c-ab7c-a737-0c52-4eeff4f0446d, last 
accessed 15 November 2015. 
                                                          
27 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Chamon, M., 2016. EU Agencies: Legal and Political Limits to the Transformation of the EU 
Administration. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Chiti E., 2009. An Important Part of the EU’s Institutional Machinery: Features, Problems and 
Perspectives of European Agencies. 46 Common Market Law Review 5 1395. 
Coen D. and Thatcher M. 2008. Network Governance and Multi-level Delegation: European 
Networks of Regulatory Agenciess. 28 Journal of Public Policy 49. 
Curtin D., Hofmann H. and Mendes J., 2013. Constitutionalising EU Executive Rule-Making 
Procedures: A Research Agenda. 19 European Law Journal 1. 
Delreux T., Adriaensen J., 2017. Conclusion. Opportunities and Challenges for the 
Principal–Agent Model in Studying the European Union. In: Delreux T., Adriaensen J. (eds) 
The Principal Agent Model and the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Dicey, A. V., 1914. Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England in the 
Nineteenth Century, 2017, Routledge. 
Eberlein B., 2008. The Making of the European Energy Market: The Interplay of Governance 
and Government. 28 Journal of Public Policy 73. 
Eberlein B. and Grande E., 2005. Beyond delegation: transnational regulatory regimes and the 
eu regulatory state. 12 Journal of European Public Policy, 89. 
EC - European Commission, 2003. Commission Decision of 11 November 2003 on establishing 
the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (2003/796/EC). OJ L 296, 14.11.2003, 
p. 34–35 
EC - European Commission, 2006.  Communication from the Commission, Inquiry pursuant to 
A17 of Regulation 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors.  COM (2006) 851 
final.https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52006DC0851  
EC – European Commission, 2010 – Staff Working Paper, Interpretative note on Directive 
2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and Directive 
2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas “The Regulatory 
Authorities” of 22 January 2010. 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2010_01_21_the_regulatory_auth
orities.pdf 
EC - European Commission, 2016a.  ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’. Brussels, Belgium.  
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/clean-energy-all-
europeans (hereinafter CEP). Up to 5 December 2018, the EU adopted four out of eight 
proposals of this package: the Energy Performance in Buildings Directive (2018/844, OJ L 156, 
28 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
19.6.2018, p. 75–91), the Energy Efficiency Directive (PE-CONS 54/18), the Renewable Energy 
Directive (PE-CONS 48/18), and the Governance Regulation (PE-CONS 55/18). 
EC - European Commission, 2016b.  Proposal for a Regulation of the European parliament and 
of the Council on the internal market for electricity (recast). COM(2016) 861/2 final. 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52016PC0861 
EC - European Commission, 2016c.  Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council establishing a European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(recast). COM(2016) 863 final. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2016:863:FIN 
EC - European Commission, 2017a. Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/460 of 16 March 2017 
establishing a network code on harmonised transmission tariff structures for gas. OJ L 72, 
17.3.2017, p. 29–56. 
EC - European Commission, 2017b. Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/459 of 16 March 2017 
establishing a network code on capacity allocation mechanisms in gas transmission systems 
and repealing Regulation (EU) No 984/2013. OJ L 72, 17.3.2017, p. 1–28. 
ECJ - European Court of Justice, 1958, Judgment in Case C - 10/56 Meroni & Co., Industrie 
Metallurgiche, SpA v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community EU:C:1958:7 
ECJ – European Court of Justice, 1981, Judgment in Case 98/80 Romano, EU:C:1981:104 
ECJ – European Court of Justice, 2009, Judgment in Case C-274/08, Commission v Sweden, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:673 
ECJ – European Court of Justice, 2014, Judgment in Case C - 270/12 United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union 
EU:C:2014:18 
EP&C – European Parliament and Council, 2009a.  Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the natural 
gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005. OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, 
p. 36–54. 
EP&C – European Parliament and Council, 2009b.  Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators. OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, p. 1–14. 
EP&C – European Parliament and Council, 2009c.  Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the 
29 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003. 
OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, p. 15–35. 
EP&C – European Parliament and Council, 2009d.  Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the 
European Parliament and of the European Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to 
the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005. OJ L 211, 
14.8.2009, p. 36–54. 
EP&C – European Parliament and Council, 2009e.  Directive 2009/73/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC. OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, p. 94–136. 
EP&C – European Parliament and Council, 2009f.  Directive 2009/72/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal 
market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC. OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, p. 55–93. 
EP&C – European Parliament and Council, 2011. Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market 
integrity and transparency, OJ L 326, 8.12.2011, p. 1–16 
EP&C – European Parliament and Council, 2013. Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on guidelines for trans-European energy 
infrastructure and repealing Decision No 1364/2006/EC and amending Regulations (EC) No 
713/2009, (EC) No 714/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009. OJ L 115, 25.4.2013, p. 39–75. 
EP&C – European Parliament and Council, 2018. Regulation Of The European Parliament And 
Of The Council on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, amending Directive 
94/22/EC, Directive 98/70/EC, Directive 2009/31/EC, Regulation (EC) No 663/2009, Regulation 
(EC) No 715/2009, Directive 2009/73/EC, Council Directive 2009/119/EC, Directive 
2010/31/EU, Directive 2012/27/EU, Directive 2013/30/EU and Council Directive (EU) 
2015/652 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 525/2013, not yet published, PE-CONS 55/18 
EP,C&EC – European Parliament, the Council of the EU, and the European Commission, 2012. 
Joint Statement on decentralized agencies. https://europa.eu/european-
union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/joint_statement_and_common_approach_2012_en.
pdf 
Ermacora, F., 2010. The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). in Jones C 
W and Webster W, EU Energy Law. The Internal Energy Market 3rd edn, Claeys & Casteels, 
Leuven. 
30 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Feltkamp, R. and Musialski, C., 2013. Integrity and Transparency in the EU Wholesale 
electricity Market – New rules for a better functioning market? OGEL (Journal of Global Energy 
Law & Regulation), Vol. 5 
Fresa, S., 2015. Multilevel EU Governance in Energy Infrastructure Development: A New Role 
for ACER? 
http://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/diw_01.c.508434.de/fresa.pdf 
Fuller, LL, 1964. The Morality of Law. Yale, New Haven. 
GC - General Court, 2016 E-Control v ACER, 2016. Case T-671/15 E-Control 
ECLI:EU:T:2016:626. 
GC – European Court of Justice, 2017. E-Control v ACER, 2017. Case T-63/16 E-Control 
ECLI:EU:T:2017:456. 
Graham, C., 2000. Regulating Public Utilities: A Constitutional Approach. Oxford, Hart. 
Graham, C., 2016 UK: The Concurrent Enforcement by Regulators of Competition Law and 
Sector-Specific Regulation. Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 7 (6), 407. 
Groenleer M., 2016. Redundancy in multi-level energy governance. TARN working paper 
6/2016. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2865683  
Hancher L. and Larouche P., 2011. The Coming of Age of EU Regulation of Network Industries 
and Services of General Economic Interest. in Craig P and Búrca G (eds), The Evolution of EU 
Law 2 edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Hancher, L. and Winters, B.M., 2017. The EU Winter Package Briefing Paper. 
http://fsr.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/The-EU-Winter-Package.pdf 
Hart, HLA, 1958. Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals. 71 Harvard Law Review 
593. 
Haverbeke D., Naesens B. and Vandorpe W., 2010. European Energy Markets and the New 
Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators. 28 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 
403. 
Heffron, R., 2016. “Shared Governance” ACER and the Roles of the National Energy and 
Competition Regulators in the EU. in Cameron, Peter and Heffron, Raphael, Legal Aspects of 
EU Energy Regulation – The Consolidation of Energy Law Across Europe. second edn, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Heffron, R. J. & McCauley, D., 2017. The concept of energy justice across the disciplines. Energy 
Policy, 105, 658-667. 
31 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Heffron, R. J. and Talus. K., 2016a. The Evolution of Energy Law and Energy Jurisprudence: 
Insights for Energy Analysts and Researchers. Energy Research and Social Science, 19, 1-10. 
Heffron, R. J. and Talus. K., 2016b. The development of energy law in the 21st century: a 
paradigm shift? Journal of World Energy Law and Business, 9 (3), 189-202. 
Helm, DR., 2012. European Energy Policy. in E. Jones, A. Menon and S. Weatherill (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook of the European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Hrabcakova, B. and Liptak, T., 2014. EU Legislation on the Electricity Market: Introducing 
Competition - Interaction between Sector-Specific Regulation and EU Competition Rules - 
Third Legislative Package. 13 Common Law Rev. 62 
Iborra, S.S., Saz-Carranza, A., Fernández-i-Marín X. Albareda A., 2018. The Governance of Goal-
Directed Networks and Network Tasks: An Empirical Analysis of European Regulatory 
Networks Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Volume 28, Issue 2, Pages 
270–292 
Johnston A., Block G., 2012. EU Energy Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Kettner-Marx, K., Kletzan-Slamanig, D., 2018. The Status of Climate Policy Integration in EU. 
Energy Policy WIFO Working Papers, No. 551. 
Labelle, M., 2017. Regulating for Consumers? The Agency for Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators. in Andersen, Svein et al., Energy Union Europe’s New Liberal Mercantilism?, 
London, Palgrave. 
Lavrijssen, S. and Hancher L., 2009. Networks on Track: From European Regulatory Networks 
to European Regulatory ‘Network Agencies’. 36 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 23 
Lavrijssen, S. and Kohlbacher, T., 2018. EU Electricity Network Codes: Good Governance in a 
Network of Networks TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2018-001. 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3098081 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3098081, accessed 
05/12/2018 
Maggetti, M., 2013. The Politics of Network Governance in Europe: The Case of Energy 
Regulation. 37 West European Politics 497. 
Maggetti, M. and Gilardi F., 2014. Network governance and the domestic adoption of soft 
rules. 21 JEPP 1293. 
Maher, I., 2009. Functional and Normative Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions: The 
Case of the European Competition Network. 7 Comparative European Politics 414. 
32 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Maher, I., Billiet S., Hodson D., 2009. The principal-agent approach to EU studies: Apply 
liberally but handle with care Comparative European Politics. 7 (4), 409-413 
Manderson, D., 2010. HLA Hart, Lon Fuller and the Ghosts of Legal Interpretation. 28 Windsor 
Yearbook of Access to Justice 81. 
Marmor, A., 2004. The Rule of Law and its Limits. 23 Law and Philosophy 1 
Mashaw, JL., 2006. Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar 
of Governance. in ML Dowdle, (ed) Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences, 
Cambridge Unviersity Press, Cambridge. 
Mastenbroek, E. & Sindbjerg, Martinsen, D., 2017. Filling the gap in the European 
administrative space: the role of administrative networks in EU implementation and 
enforcement. Journal of European Public Policy, 25:3, 422-435 
McCubbins, M.D., Noll, R.G. and Weingast, B.R., 1987. Administrative Procedures as 
Instruments of Political Control of Law. 3(2) Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 243. 
McCubbins, M.D., Noll R.G., and Weingast B.R., 1989. Structure and Process, Politics and 
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies 75 Virginia Law 
Review 431. 
Mulgan, R., 2003. Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies. Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
Pollack, M., 1997. Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community. 
International Organization, 51(1), 99–134. 
Ringel, M. and Knodt, M. 2018. The governance of the European Energy Union: Efficiency, 
effectiveness and acceptance of the Winter Package 2016. Energy Policy 112, 209-220. 
Rose, J., 2004. The Rule of Law in the Western World: An Overview. 35(4) Journal of Social 
Philosophy 457. 
Rubin, E.L., 1990-91, ‘The New Public Law: The Concept of Law and the New Public Law 
Scholarship’ 89(4) Michigan Law Review 792. 
Ruffing, E., 2014. How to Become an Independent Agency: The Creation of the German Federal 
Network Agency. 23 German Politics 43. 
Scharpf, F.W., 1999. Governing in Europe. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
33 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Schmidt, VA., 2013. Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output 
and ‘Throughput’. 61(1) Political Studies 2. 
Schneider, J.P., 2018. Energy and Trans-European Networks. in Hofmann, H., Rowe, G., and 
Türk, A.H., Specialized Administrative Law of the European Union. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Scholz, U., Purps, S., 2012. The Application of EU Competition Law in the Energy Sector. Journal 
of European Competition Law & Practice, 3(1), 76. 
Scott, C., 2000. Accountability in the Regulatory State. 27(1) Journal of Law and Society 38. 
Scott, C., 2005. Agencies for European Regulatory Governance: A Regimes Approach. in 
Géradin, D., Muñoz R., and Petit N. (eds) Regulation through Agencies in the EU: A New 
Paradigm of European Governance. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Sovacool, B. & Heffron, R., McCauley, D. and Andreas G., 2016. Energy decisions reframed as 
justice and ethical concerns. Nature Energy. 1.  
Stefan, O. & Petri, M., in press. Too Weak to Be Controlled: Judicial Review of ACER Soft Law, 
Yearbook of European Law, p.1-26. 
Tallberg, J., 2002. Delegation to supranational institutions: Why, how, and with what 
consequences? West European Politics. 25(1), 23–46. 
Talus, K., 2013. EU Energy Law and Policy A Critical Account. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Thatcher, M. and Stone Sweet, A., 2002. The Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-
Majoritarian Institutions. 25(1) West European Politics 1. 
Thompson, E., 2015. The European Union's Energy Policy: Two Track Development in Witzleb 
N., Arranz A.M. and Winand P. (eds), The European Union and Global Engagement: 
Institutions, Policies and Challenges. Edward Elgar  
Tyler, T.R., and Huo, Y.J., 2002. Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the 
Police and Courts. Russell Sage Foundation, New York. 
Unger, R., 1976. Law in Modern Society. Free Press, New York. 
Wenzel, M., 2002. The impact of Outcome Orientation and Justice Concerns on Tax 
Compliance: The Rule of Taxpayers’ Identity. 87 Journal of Applied Psychology 629.  
34 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Yataganas, X.A., 2001. Delegation of Regulatory Authority in the European Union: The 
Relevance of the American Model of Independent Agencies. Jean Monnet Working Paper 3/01 
www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/01/010301-04.html  
